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Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct:

Implications for Criminal Lawyers
by H. PatrickFurman and DanielA. Vigil

O

do Rules of Professional Conn January 1, 1993, the Coloraduct ("Rules") take effect. They
replace the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code") that has
governed the professional conduct of Colorado lawyers since 1970. The Rules appear in Title 7 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes (1992 Supplement), and in the
1992 issue of The ColoradoLawOctober
1
yer.
The Rules, which are modeled on the
American Bar Association's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"),
are the product of several years of study
by the joint Colorado Supreme Court and
Colorado Bar Association Model Rules
Committee. After public hearings, the Supreme Court adopted the Rules on May
7, 1992.
A complete discussion of the Rules,
written by members of the committee,
accompanied the Rules themselves in
the October issue of The ColoradoLawyer.2 It should be read carefully. This ar-

ticle is a supplement to the October article and addresses those rules which specifically affect prosecutors and criminal
defense lawyers.

Scope of Representation:
Rule 1.2
Rule 1.2 establishes limits on the scope
of counsel's representation of a client.
Column Ed.: H. Patrick Furman
of the University of Colorado
School of Law, Boulder-(303)
492-8126

Generally, counsel must consult with a
client and abide by the client's decisions
about the objectives of the representation and the means used to obtain those
objectives. The rule specifically provides
that in a criminal case, counsel must
abide by the client's decisions as to the
plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether to testify. The prudent lawyer should memorialize, in a
written document signed by the client,
the fact of compliance with this requirement.
Colorado's Rules contain a subsection
(f) to Rule 1.2 which does not appear in
the Model Rules. This subsection makes
it clear that the scope of representation
may not include any type of appeal to prejudice. Rule 1.2(f) states:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall
not engage in conduct that exhibits or
is intended to appeal to or engender
bias against a person on account of that
person's race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status, whether
that conduct is directed to other counsel, court personnel, witnesses, parties,
judges, judicial officers, or any persons involved in the legal process.
In People v. Sharpe,3 the Colorado Supreme Court disciplined a prosecutor who
was prosecuting Hispanic co-defendants
for saying to defense counsel, "I don't believe either one of those chili-eating bastards." The court used DR 1-102(a)(6) of
the Code-a rather vague and general
prdscription against conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice
law-as a basis for discipline. Rule 1.2(f)

is far more specific and clearly renders
such comments unethical.

Confidentiality of
Information: Rule 1.6
Rule 1.6 deals with counsel's ethical
duty regarding confidential information.
Unlike the Code, Rule 1.6 does not distinguish between "confidences" and "secrets." Rule 1.6(a) protects "information
relating to representation" and bars disclosure of such information except in certain limited circumstances, as discussed
below.
Rule 1.6(a) is more restrictive than the
Code 4 because, at least in theory, the
Code allowed counsel to reveal "secrets"
which the client had not requested be
held inviolate. The Code allowed this
disclosure if it would not be embarrassing or would not likely be detrimental to
the client. Rule 1.6 provides no such exception to the rule of confidentiality.
Rule 1.6(b) does retain a future crimes
exception nearly identical to that of the
Code: "A lawyer may reveal the intention
of the lawyer's client to commit a crime
and the information necessary to prevent the crime." The Colorado Supreme
Court did not adopt the more restrictive
This newsletter is prepared by the
CriminalLaw Section of the Colorado
Bar Association. This month's column
was written by column editorH. Patrick
Furmanand DanA. Vigil, Associate
Dean of the University of Colorado
School ofLaw, who teaches Professional Responsibility at the Law School.
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rule endorsed by the ABA, which permits disclosure only if the contemplated
crime is unlikely to result in death or substantial bodily injury.5
Rule 1.6(c) contains a second exception to the confidentiality requirement
which allows counsel to reveal confidential information (1) to the extent counsel
reasonably believes necessary to establish a claim or defense on behalf of counsel in a controversy between counsel and
client; (2) to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against counsel
based on conduct in which the client
was involved; or (3) to respond in any proceeding concerning counsel's representation of the client. Rule 1.6(c) is slightly
more6 expansive than its Code counter-
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ing co-defendants in criminal cases in two
separate instances. As a basis for discipline, the Colorado Supreme Court relied
on DR 5-105(A) and (B). Although neither the Code nor the Rules specifically
prohibit a lawyer from ever representing
co-defendants in criminal cases, doing
so is very risky because the interests of
criminal co-defendants are almost invariably in conflict. The ABA Defense
Function Standards recommend strongly against the representation of co-defendants.' In addition, many commentators
have recommended a rule flatly prohibiting joint representation.10 For these reasons, representation of criminal co-defendants should be avoided.

part.

Rule 1.6 in no way modifies or interferes with the operation of the attorneyclient privilege, which is defined by statute in Colorado. 7 The Comment to Rule
1.6 reminds practitioners that the attorney-client privilege applies in proceedings in which a lawyer is called as a witness or otherwise required to produce
evidence concerning a client. The rule,
on the other hand, applies in situations
other than those where evidence is sought
from the lawyer through compulsion of
law.

Conflict of Interest: Rule 1.7
Rule 1.7 is the general rule dealing
with conflicts of interest. It reads in relevant part as follows:
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client
or to a third person, or by the lawyer's
own interests, unless (1) the lawyer
reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the
common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
Rule 1.7(b)(2) provides for client consent after consultation. However, Rule
1.7(c) provides that a client's consent cannot be validly obtained when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation
under the circumstances. Thus, obtaining client consent must be treated carefully.
Recently, in People v. Chew, 8 counsel
was disciplined for, inter alia,represent-
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"Rule 3.6 attempts to
strike the appropriate balance
between the right to a fair
trial and the right to
free expression."

Client Under a Disability:
Rule 1.14
Rule 1.14 deals with a client whose
ability to make adequately considered
decisions in connection with the representation is impaired. The rule directs
counsel to maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship as far as is reasonably
possible. Such an impairment does not
relieve counsel of the obligation to obtain information from the client to the
extent possible.
However, CRS § 16-8-110 et seq. and
Jones v. District Court" require defense
counsel to raise the issue of the client's
mental competence if counsel is in doubt
as to the client's competence. Rule 1.14(c)
reconciles these competing obligations
by allowing counsel to seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action, but only when counsel reasonably believes that the client cannot act
in his or her own best interest. Reconciling the obligations requires counsel to
do all that can be done to work with a client under a disability. Only when the
lawyer believes that the client cannot
act in his or her own best interest may
the lawyer seek protective action.

Meritorious Claims and
Contentions: Rule 3.1
Rule 3.1 restates the longstanding
rule 2 forbidding a lawyer to bring or de-

fend a proceeding or issue which is frivolous. A good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law is not frivolous. For criminal
lawyers, the most important portion of
Rule 3.1 is the second sentence, which
contains an exception to the general rule
and allows criminal defense lawyers to
"nevertheless... defend the proceeding
as to require that every element of the
case be established." 13 Presumably, juries will continue to act as a check on
the presentation of frivolous defenses.

Expediting Litigation: Rule 3.2
Rule 3.2 requires lawyers to make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client. The Comment to Rule 3.2 makes it
clear that
realizing a financial or other benefit
from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of a
client.
Statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights generally control the expeditiousness with which criminal cases are
resolved. However, the Comment notes
that Rule 3.2 is important and is an improvement over the Code, which14said virtually nothing about this issue.

Candor Toward the
Tribunal: Rule 3.3
Rule 3.3 expresses counsel's ethical obligation to be honest with the tribunal.
(Counsel should review the October article for a discussion of Rule 3.3.) The requirement of candor toward the tribunal,
previously expressed in DR 7-102, contains at least one significant change
from the Code of which counsel must be
aware: revealing perjury by a client.
When dealing with a client who has
expressed an intention to commit perjury, counsel must first attempt to dissuade the client from the perjury. If this
effort is unsuccessful, counsel should
move to withdraw from the case. 15 While
this second step may simply throw the
ethical dilemma into someone else's lap,
it does eliminate the problem for the lawyer at hand. Furthermore, it is a course
Suof action approved by the Colorado
16
preme Court under the Code.
The real problem arises if the motion
to withdraw is denied. Various responses to this problem have been offered in
the past. The Code required counsel to
reveal a perjury to the court unless (and
this is a broad exception) the knowledge
of that fraud was protected as a confidential communication.17 One commen-

1992
1992
tator proposed treating the client as any
other witness and leaving it to the jury
to decide the truth or falsity of the testimony. 18 The ABA proposed, but never
adopted, a rule allowing counsel to put
the perjurious client on the stand but
having the client present the perjurious
testimony in narrative fashion without
19
the assistance of counsel.
Rule 3.3 is clearly different from the
Code in that the duty to respond to client
perjury applies even if counsel's knowledge of the perjury is based on a confidential communication. Rule 3.3(b) provides that the duty applies even if fulfilling it "requires disclosure of information
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6."
Rule 3.3(a)(2) provides as follows:
A lawyer shall not knowingly fail to
disclose a material fact to a tribunal
when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act
by the client.
Perjury is, of course, both criminal and
fraudulent. The Comment notes the intense debate which the problem of client
perjury has engendered, but takes the
position that a defendant's right to testify does not include the right to the
assistance of counsel in the commission of
perjury. The Comment also notes counsel's obligation under Rule 1.2(d) to
avoid implication in the commission of a
20
criminal offense.
Rule 3.3(a)(4) provides as follows:
A lawyer shall not knowingly offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false. If a lawyer has offered material
evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures.
The first two remedial measures suggested in the Comment are to call on the
client to rectify the situation and to move
to withdraw. However, if these efforts
fail, the only advice offered in the Comment is the language of the rule itself:
"take reasonable remedial measures."
With respect to what these other remedial measures may be, the rule rejects
the suggestions discussed above of the
ABA and the commentator. 2 1 No other
specific measures are suggested. The Colorado Supreme deleted any answer to
the question of whether remedial measures include disclosure to the court.2
There are two other possible remedial
measures. They are (1) revealing the perjury directly to the trial court and (2) revealing the perjury to another judge.
Revealing the perjury to another judge
could take the form of making a record
in front of a different trial judge or mak-
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ing a record outside the presence of the
trial judge for appellate review.
The decision in People v. Schultheis23
rejected a requirement that counsel reveal privileged communications to the
trial court during the trial. 24 The court
approved the procedure that counsel
employed, which was to make a record
about the perjury outside the presence
of the trial court for appellate review.
This record, in the event of a conviction,
enables the appellate court to assess
more accurately whether the defendant
was denied the effective assistance of
counsel. However, in the event of an ac-

quittal, this record might never be reviewed, and the perjury would go undetected.
Counsel should consider two points
before continuing to rely on Schultheis.
First, that case was decided under the
Code. It is unclear whether this response
to the problem of witness perjury will be
approved by the court under the Rules
because the Rules show a clear intent to
deal with client perjury more strongly.
Second, Schultheis involved perjury by a
witness, not a defendant. There are additional constitutional considerations
when the witness is also the defendant.
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The only limitation on the duty to reveal client perjury recognized in the Comments to the Rules is the possibility that
a court might find that constitutional
rights to due process and counsel require
a lawyer to present false testimony by a
client in a criminal case. However, the
U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that
a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to commit perjury.25 Thus,
protection for such perjury would have
to be found in a state constitutional provision. While the Comment to Rule 3.3
indicates that some states have found
such protection, 26 no Colorado court has
found it in the Colorado Constitution.
The net result is confusion. It is clear
that the Rules attempt to place a greater
burden on counsel to prevent and reveal
client perjury, yet it remains unclear precisely how counsel should meet that burden.
With respect to the perjurious nonclient witness, Rule 3.3(a)(4) forbids counsel knowingly to offer evidence which
counsel knows is false. This is similar to
DR 7-102(a)(4). "Knowingly" denotes actual knowledge.2 If counsel does not know
the evidence is false, but reasonably believes it is false, counsel may (not must)
refuse to offer it under Rule 3.3(c). "Believes" denotes "that the person involved
actually supposed
the fact in question to
8
2

be true."

The other requirements of Rule 3.3 are
similar to those contained in the Code.
Rule 3.3(a)(3) forbids counsel knowingly
to fail to disclose controlling case law
which is directly adverse to counsel's position and which was not revealed by opposing counsel. This longstanding obligation, previously expressed in DR 7-106(B)
(1), has historically been viewed merely
as a challenge to counsel's ability to distinguish adverse cases from the case at
bar. Properly viewed, however, it is an expression of the commitment of the legal
profession to integrity and professionalism.
Rule 3.3(d) establishes an additional
duty of candor in ex parte proceedings.
Counsel in an ex parte proceeding has a
duty to inform the tribunal of all material facts known to counsel, favorable or
adverse, which will enable the tribunal
to make an informed decision. Ex parte
proceedings include grand jury proceedings, 29 which raises the question of how
much exculpatory evidence a prosecutor
should be required to present to a grand
jury.
Application of Rule 3.3(d) to prosecutors presenting cases to grand juries was

apparently not considered by the drafters. 30 The U.S. Supreme Court recently
held that neither the Fifth Amendment
nor the court's supervisory powers allow
a court to dismiss an indictment for failure to present exculpatory evidence. 31Presumably, Rule 3.3(d) is not intended to
turn grand juries into full-blown adjudicative bodies. However, the rule seems to
impose some duty on prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence.
All of these rules relating to candor
toward the tribunal are circumscribed by
Rule 3.3(b), which provides that the duties described in Rule 3.3(a) "continue to
the conclusion of the proceeding." The
ABA has interpreted "to the conclusion
of the proceeding" to mean prior to final
judgment and when disclosure is necessary to prevent the judgment from being
corrupted
by the client's unlawful con2
3

duct.

Fairness to Opposing Party
And Counsel: Rule 3.4
Rule 3.4, entitled "Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel," is premised on
the principle that the adversary system
works best when the opposing parties
have full access to the evidence and
when witnesses and the trial process remain free of improper influences. The
rule forbids a variety of conduct which
undermines this principle.
While the forbidden conduct is of a sort
more commonly occurring in civil litigation, Rule 3.4 applies to all litigation. Most
of the provisions are similar to those in
the Code. 33 The only portion of the rule
specifically applying to criminal cases is
subsection (e), which precludes counsel
from expressing a personal opinion as to
the justness of a cause or the guilt or innocence of an accused.34

Impartiality and Decorum of
The Tribunal: Rule 3.5
Rule 3.5 prohibits lawyers from (1)
seeking to illegally influence judges, witnesses or other officials, (2) engaging in
ex parte communications with such persons except as permitted by law and (3)
engaging in conduct intended to disrupt
a tribunal. The Comment to this rule suggests that lawyers familiarize themselves with the Code of Judicial Conduct
in order to avoid contributing to a violation of that code. The Committee Comment to Rule 3.5 notes that this rule simply makes it unethical to do that which
is already illegal. It views the new rule
as an improvement over DR 7-106(C) because it is more specific.

Trial Publicity: Rule 3.6
Rule 3.6 deals with trial publicity and
is the analog to DR 7-107 of the Code. The
rule is based on the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and the ABA
Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free
Press. It attempts to strike the appropriate balance between the right to a fair
trial and the right to free expression. This
rule is subservient to the special rules
relating to juvenile, domestic relations,
mental disability and other proceedings.'
Rule 3.6(a) sets forth the basics as follows:
A lawyer shall not make an extra-judicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by
means of public communication if the
lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that it is likely to create a grave
danger of imminent and substantial
harm to the fairness of an adjudicative proceeding.
Rule 3.6(b) provides several types ofstatements ordinarily likely to have such an
effect. The most significant examples in
criminal cases include statements relating to character, credibility, reputation,
criminal record, expected testimony, plea
negotiations, statements or silence of the
accused, test results, inadmissible prejudicial evidence and opinions as to guilt
or innocence.
Rule 3.6(c) sets forth various exceptions to the general rule. Most of these relate to information in the public record
or are necessary to protect the public. In
criminal cases, Rule 3.6(c)(7) allows counsel to state, without elaboration: (1) the
identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused; (2) information
needed to help apprehend a fugitive defendant; (3) the time and place of arrest;
and (4) the identity of the arresting officer.

Special Responsibilities of a
Prosecutor: Rule 3.8
Rule 3.8, entitled "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor," mirrors the Model
Rule and is based on the ABA Standards
of Criminal Justice relating to the prosecution function. The Code set forth the
ethical duties ofprosecutors in DR 7-103.3
The Rules provide a more detailed description of the ethical responsibilities of
prosecutors. In addition to forbidding
prosecutors from pursuing charges in
the absence of probable cause37 and requiring disclosure of exculpatory material,38 the rule lists several other duties.
Prosecutors must make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been

1992

1992

advised of the right to counsel and the
procedure for obtaining counsel. 39 Unless there has been a valid waiver of
counsel, prosecutors should not seek to
obtain a waiver of important pretrial
rights. 40 These procedures should be
read in conjunction with legislation
passed this year altering the rights of
indigent defendants to court-appointed
counsel in the pretrial stages of certain
41
misdemeanor charges.
Prosecutors must not only follow the
guidelines about public statements contained in Rule 3.6, but also exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, police, employees and other court personnel from making such statements.
Finally, Rule 3.8(f) addresses the problem of prosecutorial subpoenas aimed at
criminal defense lawyers. This issue is
addressed at length in the October article mentioned above. 42 Practitioners are
encouraged to review that discussion.

Communications with

Persons Represented by
Counsel: Rule 4.2
Rule 4.2 addresses communication with
a person represented by counsel. It prohibits counsel from communication with
a party that counsel knows is represented about the subject matter of the representation, unless counsel has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized
by law to communicate. The rule is essentially the same as DR 7-104(A) of the
Code.
The operation of Rule 4.2 is limited to
communications about the subject of the
representation. Consider a defendant
who has been charged with theft and
has retained counsel. If the defendant is
also under investigation for, but has not
been charged with, the sale of marijuana, a prosecutor may ethically direct an
undercover police officer to meet with
the defendant, without notifying counsel, to discuss the purchase of marijuana.
This prosecutorial action is ethical because the subject discussed was something other than the subject of the representation. The Colorado Supreme Court
previously held that such an action by
a prosecutor was not ethical under the
Code. 4a

Dealing with Unrepresented
Persons: Rule 4.3
Rule 4.3 addresses counsel's dealings
with an unrepresented person. It requires
counsel to make it clear that he or she
represents a client and is not a disinterested party. When counsel knows, or rea-

2563

CRIMINAL LAW NEWSLETTER

2563

CRIMINAL LAW NEWSLETTER

sonably should know, that the unrepresented person misunderstands counsel's role, counsel must take reasonable
steps to correct the misunderstanding.
Counsel shall not give advice to the unrepresented person other than advice to
obtain counsel.
CRS § 16-7-301 provides that a district
attorney should engage in plea discussions or reach plea agreements with the
defendant only through, or in the presence of, defense counsel. The statute then
addresses several exceptions allowing
the district attorney to deal directly with
the defendant. When a district attorney
is dealing directly with a defendant pursuant to one of the exceptions, the district
attorney must comply with Rule 4.3.

Accepting Appointments:
Rule 6.2
Rule 6.2 deals with court appointments.
Pursuant to Rule 6.2, a lawyer shall not
seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal
except for good cause. Good cause exists
when (1) representing the client is likely
to result in a violation of the Rules or the
law, (2) it places an unreasonable and
oppressive burden on counsel or (3) "the
client or the cause is so repugnant to the
lawyer as to be likely to impair the cli-

ent-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's
ability to represent the client."
Distinguishing between the "repugnance of the cause" and the "repugnance
of the subject matter," the Comment to
Rule 6.2 states that
good cause does not include such factors as the repugnance of the subject
matter of the proceeding....
The difference between these two
phrases is not explained. The Comment
also makes it clear that the identity or
position of a person involved in the case,
or the belief of the lawyer that the defendant in a criminal proceeding is guilty,
does not constitute good cause for refusing to accept an appointment.
Finally, counsel should note that Rule
6.2 uses the word "shall," which is clearly mandatory language. Under the Code,
all provisions discussing court appointments were aspirational ethical considerations.

Information About Legal
Services: Rules 7.1-7.5
Rules 7.1 through 7.5 address information about legal services. These rules
deal with communications concerning a
lawyer's services, advertising, direct contact with prospective clients, communi-
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cation of fields of practice and firm names
and letterheads. Counsel can find a discussion of these rules in the October article. Two rules of special concern to criminal lawyers are discussed in this section.
Rule 7.3 addresses contact with prospective clients and regulates solicitation. Pursuant to Rules 7.1 and 7.3, and
consistent with Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Association," a lawyer may use a written or recorded communication to solicit
professional employment from a prospective client known to be in need of legal services in a particular matter.
Thus, targeted mailings are ethical
under the Rules. However, they are disfavored by the Colorado legislature and
the Colorado Bar Association ("CBA"). A
1992 statute prohibits the use of public
and criminal justice records for the pursoliciting business for pecuniary
pose of
45
gain.
The CBA Board of Governors recently
adopted a proposal aimed at restricting
the use of targeted mailings. The proposal recommends that Rule 7.3 be amended by the addition of a new subsection
making it unethical for a lawyer to solicit a client by written or recorded communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical,
emotional or mental state of the prospective client precludes that person from exercising reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer. The proposal creates a presumption that a prospective client is able
to exercise reasonable judgment if at
least twenty days have passed since the
event for which the legal representation
is being solicited. The proposal has been
forwarded to the Colorado Supreme
Court.
Rule 7.4 deals with communications
about fields of practice. A lawyer may
communicate the fact that the lawyer
does or does not practice criminal law or
any other field. A lawyer may state or
imply that the lawyer is a criminal law
specialist as long as the communication
does not violate the proscriptions in Rule

•7.1 against false or misleading commu•nications, the creation of unjustified expectations or unsubstantiated comparisons with other lawyers.

Conclusion
The legal profession remains one which
essentially governs itself. The ability to
remain free from outside regulation depends on those in the profession keeping
their own house in order.
Because criminal cases are often in the
news, the public's perception of whether
the legal profession's house is in order is
frequently based on the professionalism
of criminal lawyers. Adherence to the

Rules of Professional Conduct is not only
the right thing to do, it is necessary to
maintain the independence of the bar.
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CBA International Law Committee to Meet December 17
The CBA International Law Committee will hold its monthly luncheon meeting at noon on December 17 in the Denver Athletic Club. Attorney Karen Ostrander-Krug will speak on "Doing Business with the Former Soviet Republics. Ostrander-Krug
has practiced law in Russia and is the only U.S. attorney licensed to practice law in the Ukraine. CLE credit is anticipated.
The cost of the luncheon is $13.50, payable to the Colorado Bar Association. Anyone who reserves a lunch and does not cancel
at least forty-eight hours before the luncheon will be charged for the lunch. Reservations should be faxed by noon on December
15 to Jan Hammerman in Denver at (303) 446-0803. If faxing is not possible, phone Mr. Hammerman at (303) 446-0011.

